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Abstract
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, by employing a macro-
level institutional dataset on benefit levels for social assistance (SA) and minimum
income protection (MIP) in 22 European countries in the period 1990–2013, I show
that the adequacy of income support for low-income inactive individuals in
European welfare states has been steadily decreasing since 1994. Second, the paper
revisits empirically the hypothesis of a trade-off between the adequacy of out-of-
work benefits and the public expenditure on active labor market policies (ALMPs).
The empirical results of the fixed effects model show that the trade-off does not
appear to be significant in any of the tested specifications. The results are robust to
the introduction of a set of conventional controls related to the labor market.
JEL Classification: H53, H55, I38.
Keywords: Social assistance, Minimum income protection, Active labor market
policies, European welfare states
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the relationship between the adequacy of minimum safety-nets
and the increased focus on activation strategies in labor market policies in European
welfare states. To which extent can the effectiveness of activation policies go hand in
hand with offering adequate levels of minimum income protection (MIP, hereafter)
and social assistance (SA, hereafter)? On the one hand, do minimum income schemes
have to be integrated in the overall activation framework and hence reduced in magni-
tude in order not to distort work incentives? On the other hand, how to achieve that
balance whilst ensuring that minimum income schemes do not end up creating poverty
traps? These broad questions lie behind the empirical analysis of the current paper,
which aims at testing two opposite working hypotheses on the issue. It has to be
pointed out that, instead of taking a normative stand on the balance between activation
and out-of-work benefits, the current study aims at showing what has been the actual
practice in European welfare states from 1990 to 2013.
Immervoll (2012) has analyzed the policy design and effectiveness of minimum in-
come benefits in OECD countries. Nelson (2013) has explored the question of to
which extent social assistance in European welfare states provides protection against
low income. On the other hand, a meta-analysis of the literature on activation strat-
egies implemented in labor markets of OECD countries has been provided by Card et
al. (2010). The interaction between activation and income support has been
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investigated by Immervoll and Scarpetta (2012), advocating for an effective policy mix
based on the right balance between activation, income support, and work incentives. In
the economic literature, Besley and Coate (1992) have analyzed this issue by exploring
the incentive case for workfare. Their conclusion is that, for there to be a deterrent ar-
gument for workfare (i.e., for the benefits for a reduced number of poor exceeding the
induced total costs of workfare), the government will have to impose significantly more
than a small work requirement. Molander and Torsvik (2015) investigate and analyze
from a normative point of view the main arguments justifying implementation of
mandatory activation for benefit recipients. The four arguments highlighted and com-
paratively evaluated are efficiency, sustainability, paternalism, and justice. All these im-
portant contributions in the economic and social policy literature provided the ground
for the development of the research question of this paper, which is introduced as
follows.
A conceptual framework is outlined in the next section in order to frame the
two working hypotheses which are subsequently tested in the empirical analysis.
The framework is constituted by the “disincentive” view prescribing low out-of-
work benefits parallel to a high expenditure on active labor market policies
(ALMPs, hereafter) and by the “generosity” view, which would instead complement
the high expenditure on ALMPs with higher benefit levels. Hence, the main re-
search question arises as such: which of these two “views” or working hypotheses
are supported by the data on minimum income schemes and expenditure on acti-
vation for European welfare states?
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows. Firstly, by employing
the dataset on benefit levels of SA and minimum income protection (MIP) in 22
European countries in the period 1990–2013, the descriptive empirical analysis indi-
cates a marked reduction as regards the adequacy of income support for inactive low-
income individuals in European welfare states since 1994. This stylized fact, seemingly
providing initial support for the “disincentive” view, constitutes the ground for the pro-
ceeding of the analysis on the interaction of provision of out-of-work benefits with acti-
vation. Second, the paper tests empirically the null hypothesis of the presence of a
trade-off between the adequacy of benefit levels and the aggregate expenditure on
ALMPs. The empirical analysis posits different specifications of the fixed effects model,
in order to guarantee robustness of the results. The results indicate that the trade-off
does not appear to be significant, in any of the tested specifications. Whenever signifi-
cant, the sign of the coefficient indicating a covariation between out-of-work benefits
and expenditure on activation is slightly positive. In other words, the “generosity” view
seems to receive support from the data, indicating that it is the overall expenditure and
degree of generosity of the welfare states that matters. A generous welfare state will
provide both high out-of-work benefits and high expenditure on activation, whilst a less
generous one will cut on the benefits without investing in activation. These results are
proven robust to the introduction of a set of conventional controls related to the labor
market.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, the conceptual framework is outlined.
The data and the stylized facts are presented in Section 3, whilst Section 4 describes
the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the results, whilst Section 6 discusses them in
light of the conceptual framework. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Conceptual framework
This section aims at presenting the conceptual framework which will be empirically
tested in the rest of the article. The actual relationship between social assistance and
minimum income protection, in general defined as minimum income schemes (MISs,
hereafter) or out-of-work benefits, and activation policies is pinned down by govern-
ment authorities, mainly based on two counteracting considerations.
[1]On one side, the “disincentive” view prescribes that benefits must be kept low
not to distort work incentives, so that inactive low-income individuals would
take part in activation programs rather than relying on passive benefits. Hence,
assuming that the authorities take into account this trade-off for a representative
(average) benefit receiver, we should as a result observe a trade-off between
benefits and activation at the macro-institutional level as well. Frazer and Marlier
(2009) in their overview about the adequacy of MISs across EU member states
include a detailed list of the specific disincentives to take up work for inactive
individuals. The stylized fact of increased obligations of welfare recipients at the
European level, jointly with the erosion of out-of-work benefit levels, has been
highlighted as the potential realization of a trade-off between activation and
benefits in Nelson (2013) for the period 1990–2007 in 19 European countries.
The current paper aims at testing this hypothesis of trade-off against the following
alternative hypothesis.
[2]On the other hand, European countries in the last decades aimed at combining a
strategy of poverty reduction for individuals who are not working, jointly with
promotion of return to employment (OECD, 2005). This joint strategy, which I
label as the “generosity” view, would correspond to a policy of maintaining (or even
increasing) the current levels of adequacy of income support whilst increasing
expenditure on ALMPs. This view is backed-up by Frazer and Marlier (2009), who
provide a list of policy-oriented suggestions to EU member states, and precisely
address the strategy to avoid disincentive effects whilst at the same time ensuring
adequacy of MISs.
Which of these two working hypotheses have prevailed in the actual policy making of
the European countries’ authorities in the years 1990–2013? In order to give a tentative
answer to this empirical question, I turn to the data in the next section.
3 Data and stylized facts
At first, the study aims at presenting some stylized facts related to social assistance
(SA) and minimum income protection (MIP) benefits in Europe. The dataset utilized in
this work is the social assistance and minimum income protection (SAMIP) dataset,
which includes detailed comparable information on the benefit levels of individuals re-
ceiving income support in a large number of European countries, for the years 1990–
2013. The full SAMIP dataset contains benefit levels for three typical households: a
single person, a lone parent, and a two parent family. However, this study focuses ex-
clusively on the single person case, whilst the two other households are excluded due
to missing data (for the full period 1990–2013) on mean equivalized income necessary
to compute the abovementioned adequacy measures.1
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The SA rates from the SAMIP dataset employed in this study are denominated in
local currency, for a single adult person below retirement age and without children, ex-
cluding for instance housing costs and other benefits. The MIP levels build on the SA
rates, by including housing costs and other benefits. The SA and MIP benefit levels for
a total of 22 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) are
then standardized by either GDP per capita or by average annual wages,2 providing an
internationally comparable proxy of the adequacy or relative “generosity” of out-of-
work benefits in a given country. The main variables in the dataset used for the empir-
ical analysis of this work are summarized in Table 1.
The stylized facts about the series on adequacy of SA and MIP are presented below.
Figure 1 shows an overall decreasing tendency for the median adequacy of social assist-
ance in European countries. The turn from a slight upward tendency to a decreasing
one takes place around year 1994, from which SA adequacy inevitably declines until
year 2005, remaining stable from then onwards.
As shown in Fig. 2, variation across countries appears to be wider for the adequacy of
MIP as compared to that of SA. In addition, we observe a tendency towards a lower
average and median level for both schemes in 2013 as compared to 1990. In other
words, Figs. 1 and 2 indicate that both SA and MIP adequacies have been reduced at
the overall European level. The hypothesis that this result has been endogenously
driven by contemporaneous growth in GDP per capita is relevant for the countries
taken individually, but becomes less plausible at the cross-country level.
Another stylized fact is provided by simply focusing on the 1990–2013 series for the
sample variance of SA adequacy for the 22 European countries included in the analysis.
Figure 3 plots this time series, computed by using yearly SA rates.
As shown in Fig. 3, after an initial period 1990–2000 with significant jumps in the
variance of SA adequacy, the period from 2000 onwards presents an approximately
constant level among European countries (a set of standard unit-root tests have been
conducted as well, rejecting the unit-root null hypothesis at the 95% confidence level).
This evidence applies to both measures of adequacy, independently of whether the de-
nominator is given by GDP per capita or average annual wages. A thorough empirical
analysis of the issue of convergence or divergence as regards the path of SA adequacy
Table 1 Summary statistics for the main variables in the dataset
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
SA/GDP per capita 490 0.1905 0.0657 0.0535 0.4344
SA/avg. annual wages 482 0.1797 0.0540 0.0611 0.3414
MIP/GDP per capita 489 0.2707 0.0899 0.1036 0.5054
MIP/avg. annual wages 482 0.2572 0.0832 0.1066 0.5364
ALMP (as % of GDP) 467 2.0488 1.249 0.15 7.07
Trade union density 508 35.898 20.511 5.6543 83.862
Total employment index 377 94.732 11.823 52.206 146.27
Unemployment (% of labor force) 516 8.0393 4.2666 0.4689 26.187
Note. Data sources. (1) OECD.Stat (2016) for: GDP per capita at current prices; average annual wages; ALMP as % of GDP;
trade union density; total employment index; unemployment as % of labor force. (2) SAMIP (2016) dataset for: SA rates;
MIP rates
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among European countries lies outside the scope of this paper. However, it has to be
pointed out that Nelson (2008) analyzed trends and levels of minimum income protec-
tion in Europe for the period 1990–2005 and his results point in the direction of a con-
verging path.
How does the previous literature explain the decreasing level of adequacy for SA and
MIP from around 1994 onwards? Marchal et al. (2016) have highlighted the role of aus-
terity in order to obtain a causal explanation of this retrenchment in the generosity de-
gree of SA and MIP since the 1990s. The current study, rather than revisiting the
analysis of the fundamental determinants of out-of-work benefit levels, aims instead at
exploring the relationship between adequacy of benefits and activation policies at the
cross-country level, as explained in the conceptual framework of the previous section.
Let us turn now to the stylized facts on activation policies, primarily aimed at bring-
ing individuals back to employment. Due to high heterogeneity across countries in the
approaches to activation as documented by Escudero (2015) and to the specific re-
search question under analysis, this work focuses on the aggregate value given by coun-
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Fig. 1 Social Assistance adequacy, 1990–2013. Note: social assistance (SA) yearly rates standardized by GDP
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Fig. 2 Minimum income protection adequacy, 1990–2013. Note: minimum income protection (MIP) yearly
rates standardized by GDP per capita for 22 European countries in the years 1990–2013
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extensively documented the evidence of an increase in public expenditure related to ac-
tive labor market policies (ALMPs) in European countries in the last decades, also in
relation to their effectiveness. The above evidence (Figs. 1 and 2) of decreasing SA and
MIP adequacy combined with a sustained public expenditure in ALMPs pins down the
research question of this paper, which aims at investigating the validity of the above-
mentioned working hypotheses based on the “disincentive” or “generosity” views. Let
us observe in Fig. 4 the joint scatter plot for both SA and MIP adequacy and the
fraction of GDP spent on ALMPs.
Figure 4 points to a somewhat positive relationship between both SA (red) and MIP
(blue) adequacy and the fraction of GDP dedicated to ALMPs. The investigation of the
actual relationship between these variables will be the main task of the following sec-
tions where the empirical analysis is conducted.
4 Empirical strategy
The relationships I estimated are represented by the following pair of log-log alternative
specifications:
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Fig. 4 SA and MIP adequacy and ALMPs, 1990–2013
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MIPj;t ¼ δj þ πt þ τALMPj;t þ μ0j;tρþ ∈ j;t ; ð2Þ
in which SAj,t in (1) and MIPj,t in (2) are respectively the log of SA and MIP adequacy
variables for country j, standardized either by GDP per capita or by average annual
wages;3 aj and δj are dummy variables estimating country fixed effects; βt and πt estimate
time fixed effects; ALMPj,t represents the log of the fraction of GDP invested in active
labor market policies for country j; θ’j,t and μ’j,t include a set of conventional covariates re-
lated to labor market institutions (trade union density, total employment, unemployment
as a % of the labor force); and ∈j,t are error terms adjusted for country clustering.
As regards the choice of the specific control variables, trade union density (TUD,
hereafter) has been included based on the following logic. Assume for instance that the
results indicate a trade-off between out-of-work benefits and ALMPs so to confirm the
“disincentive” view. The expected positive effect of higher TUD on the wages for the
low-skilled labor force would potentially make out-of-work benefits relatively less ap-
pealing for these workers, hence contributing to mitigate the significance and robust-
ness of the trade-off with activation policies.
For each of the two adequacy measures, models (1) and (2) were estimated at first by
pooled OLS with standard errors clustered by countries. Subsequently, the dummy var-
iables estimating country and time fixed effects were introduced. At last, in order to
take into account as well for the hypothesis of autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic error
terms, (1) and (2) were estimated in the presence of AR (1) disturbance.
A remark about endogeneity issues has to be done here. Given the specifications of
(1) and (2) and the policy variables at hand, the risk of endogeneity does not allow to
exclude the presence of reverse causality at this stage. However, this does not need to
fully invalidate the research question of the current study. On one side, results indicat-
ing weak significance for the effect of ALMPs on SA/MIP would for instance give evi-
dence in the direction of disregarding the “disincentive” view mentioned above, since
that hypothesis requires a strongly significant inverse relationship to be confirmed. On
the other hand, in case of positive and significant relationship between SA/MIP ad-
equacy and ALMPs, the evidence would lead to a preference for the “generosity” view,
regardless of the underlying direction of causality. In other words, the aim of the
current exploratory study is to open the field for future research on this specific rela-
tionship, which should also be supported by analyses at the within-country level for
which a more powerful identification strategy and a higher level of detail can be ob-
tained. The results of the different estimations are presented in the next section.
5 Econometric results
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 below report the effects of the expenditure of ALMPs on the SA
and MIP adequacy variables as specified by (1) and (2) and estimated by pooled OLS
with clustered standard errors, for each of the two standardizations (either GDP per
capita in Tables 2 and 3 or average annual wages in Tables 4 and 5).
The OLS coefficients in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 are elasticities; hence, they show the ex-
pected percentage change for SA/MIP adequacy when the fraction of GDP devoted to
ALMPs increases by 1%. A first look at these introductory results indicate that ALMPs
have a positive and significant effect on both SA and MIP adequacy, with the latter be-
ing strongly significant when all controls are included as well. The magnitude of the
Iacono IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2017) 6:1 Page 7 of 15
effect does not overcome the 0.3% of the initial adequacy rates (in other words, an elas-
ticity of 0.3). As predicted in the previous section, the introduction of TUD as a control
has the effect of reducing the impact of ALMPs on adequacy rates, indicating that the
relationship becomes milder with higher wages for the low-skilled individuals.
These results might be biased by time-invariant and country-specific factors simul-
taneously affecting the dependent variable and the regressors. Hence, we move to the
fixed effects (FE, hereafter) model specification which controls for all the across-
country action, in order to exploit the within-country variation over time.
Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 below report now the effects of the expenditure of ALMPs on
the SA/MIP adequacy variables as estimated by the FE model, for each of the two stan-
dardizations (either GDP per capita in Tables 6 and 7 or average annual wages in
Tables 8 and 9).
The FE results of the above Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 indicate that, mostly for the case of
the SA adequacy (under both the possible standardizations), the significance of the
pooled OLS coefficients was due to some unobservable time-invariant and country spe-
cific variable, which has been now taken away by the FE dummies. When it comes to
the MIP adequacy, the effects of ALMPs are slightly less significant, however mostly of
the same magnitude as in the simpler pooled OLS models. Notice that, until now, none
Table 2 Log-log model estimated by pooled OLS with clustered standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAGDP SAGDP SAGDP SAGDP
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.253*** 0.207*** 0.149** 0.0915
(0.0687) (0.0545) (0.0560) (0.102)
Trade union density 0.393*** 0.348* 0.360*
(0.0977) (0.142) (0.147)
Total employment −0.399 −0.384
(0.236) (0.227)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0778
(0.0946)
Obs. 445 440 318 318
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 3 Log-log model estimated by pooled OLS with clustered standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MIPGDP MIPGDP MIPGDP MIPGDP
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.294*** 0.262*** 0.239*** 0.189***
(0.0548) (0.0436) (0.0393) (0.0405)
Trade union density 0.237** 0.216* 0.223**
(0.0786) (0.0843) (0.0839)
Total employment −0.402 −0.392
(0.217) (0.202)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0671
(0.0565)
Obs. 445 440 318 318
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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of the above eight specifications entails a trade-off between ALMPs and SA/MIP ad-
equacy measures.
At last, in order to take into account the possibility of serial correlation in the error
terms which would determine inconsistency and biasness of both the OLS and the FE
models, a last set of regressions has been conducted by assuming a AR (1) disturbance
term, in addition to country and time FE. Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 below report the re-
sults of these regressions.
The results of these last Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 can be summarized as follows. The ef-
fects of ALMPs on SA and MIP adequacy variables are now strongly significant, however
only for the standardization with respect to GDP per capita (Tables 10 and 11). The mag-
nitude of the effect has been now reduced though, to a maximum level of 0.169% increase
in adequacy. The effects on adequacy measures shown in Tables 12 and 13 appear instead
not to be significant, in contradiction to the previous FE results of Tables 8 and 9. A thor-
ough discussion of these results is provided in the next section.
6 Discussion
This section aims at interpreting the results of the empirical analysis in light of the
conceptual framework outlined at the beginning of this paper. The econometric results
Table 4 Log-log model estimated by pooled OLS with clustered standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAW SAW SAW SAW
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.113 0.0813 0.0505 0.0153
(0.0587) (0.0540) (0.0542) (0.113)
Trade union density 0.304** 0.307 0.313
(0.111) (0.167) (0.173)
Total employment 0.185 0.193
(0.237) (0.235)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0483
(0.102)
Obs. 438 437 315 315
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, **p < 0.01
Table 5 Log-log model estimated by pooled OLS with clustered standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MIPW MIPW MIPW MIPW
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.147*** 0.134*** 0.139*** 0.109**
(0.0361) (0.0318) (0.0268) (0.0401)
Trade union density 0.134 0.159 0.164
(0.0687) (0.0920) (0.0914)
Total employment 0.172 0.179
(0.216) (0.207)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0398
(0.0525)
Obs. 438 437 315 315
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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provide a strong evidence of 0 out of 12 model specifications estimating a significant
trade-off (i.e., a negative coefficient) between out-of-work benefits and activation.
Hence, the results point in the direction of rejecting the “disincentive” view
(highlighted in Nelson, 2013) formulated in the conceptual framework. In other words,
the results seem to disregard the hypothesis that policy makers in European welfare
states have designed MISs precisely in order to avoid the potential trade-off with activa-
tion strategies. The robustness of this result to alternative model specifications and
across adequacy measures provides an important evidence to take into account in fu-
ture empirical research of the issue at the cross-country level and a fruitful starting
point for causal empirical analyses at the within-country level.
Secondly, it has to be pointed out that, whenever significant, the effects of ALMPs on
SA/MIP adequacy (or vice versa, due to reverse causality) are positive regardless of the
Table 6 Log-log model with country and time fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAGDP SAGDP SAGDP SAGDP
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.141 0.156* 0.120* 0.0139
(0.0720) (0.0567) (0.0470) (0.124)
Trade union density 0.216 0.297 0.265
(0.120) (0.195) (0.182)
Total employment −0.227 −0.139
(0.299) (0.330)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.136
(0.132)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.435 0.454 0.402 0.423
Obs. 445 440 318 318
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05
Table 7 Log-log model with country and time fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MIPGDP MIPGDP MIPGDP MIPGDP
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.140*
(0.0508) (0.0511) (0.0548) (0.0517)
Trade union density 0.0478 0.166 0.140
(0.130) (0.155) (0.163)
Total employment −0.248 −0.175
(0.166) (0.131)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.114
(0.0570)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.516 0.502 0.563 0.583
Obs. 445 440 318 318
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001
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model specification (although the magnitude is not large). In other words, this pattern
points in the direction of supporting the alternative “generosity” view. Increased expend-
iture on ALMPs in European welfare states has gone (for some countries) hand in hand
with a sustained level of adequacy of minimum income protection and social assistance.
A possible interpretation of this evidence goes as follows: it is the overall generosity of the
welfare state expenditure that matters. This means that generous welfare states do offer
both sustained out-of-work benefit levels, in addition to investing larger fractions of the
GDP in activation and reintegration strategies for the inactive individuals. On the other
hand, smaller welfare states with a lower degree of overall generosity (measured for in-
stance by the total fraction of GDP devoted to social insurance, activation, and out-of-
work benefits) would cut on the adequacy of benefits, whilst at the same time not consid-
ering ALMPs as an alternative option. The next section contains the concluding remarks.
Table 8 Log-log model with country and time fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAW SAW SAW SAW
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.0727 0.0838 0.0497 −0.0441
(0.0709) (0.0572) (0.0454) (0.135)
Trade union density 0.244 0.208 0.171
(0.129) (0.236) (0.210)
Total employment 0.338 0.415
(0.283) (0.319)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.119
(0.134)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.190 0.238 0.165 0.189
Obs. 438 437 315 315
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
Table 9 Log-log model with country and time fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MIPW MIPW MIPW MIPW
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.145** 0.148** 0.153** 0.0743
(0.0496) (0.0478) (0.0444) (0.0518)
Trade union density 0.0610 0.0623 0.0314
(0.0998) (0.162) (0.163)
Total employment 0.314 0.378**
(0.149) (0.122)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0999
(0.0517)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.252 0.257 0.258 0.288
Obs. 438 437 315 315
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, **p < 0.01
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7 Conclusions
The main theme of this study was to investigate the actual shape of the relation-
ship between the adequacy of minimum safety nets and the aggregate expenditure
on activation strategies in labor market policies of European welfare states. Rather
than exploring this relationship at the normative level or at the microeconomic
theoretical level, the approach has been that of investigating the actual practice of
authorities in European welfare states in the period 1990–2013. At first, a concep-
tual framework outlined the two competing working hypotheses, labeled as the
“disincentive” and the “generosity” views. The former prescribes a trade-off be-
tween the level of out-of-work benefits and activation, in order to increase efficacy
of ALMPs when it comes to reintegrating inactive individuals into the labor force.
The latter works instead by allowing a joint strategy of sustained level of adequacy
of income support whilst at the same time increased government expenditure on
activation strategies. The SAMIP dataset provided the yearly rates of SA and MIP
Table 10 Log-log model with AR (1) disturbance, fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAGDP SAGDP SAGDP SAGDP
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.136*** 0.169*** 0.131*** 0.0901**
(0.0227) (0.0219) (0.0263) (0.0332)
Trade union density −0.375*** −0.151 −0.223*
(0.0659) (0.0976) (0.104)
Total employment −0.335*** −0.276**
(0.0863) (0.0906)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0762*
(0.0377)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 423 418 302 302
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 11 Log-log model with AR (1) disturbance, fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MIPGDP MIPGDP MIPGDP MIPGDP
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.146*** 0.166*** 0.141*** 0.0982***
(0.0210) (0.0203) (0.0216) (0.0275)
Trade union density −0.225*** −0.0534 −0.119
(0.0552) (0.0768) (0.0805)
Total employment −0.233*** −0.187**
(0.0670) (0.0689)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0762*
(0.0308)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 423 418 302 302
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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employed in order to construct the series of adequacy of minimum income
schemes for up to 22 European welfare states. Although the cross-country empir-
ical analysis conducted in this study cannot exclude the possibilities of reverse
causality, the results provide unambiguous evidence so to disregard the “disincentive”
hypothesis. More precisely, the results indicate that, whenever significant, the effect
of increased expenditure on ALMPs does not imply parallel cuts in the adequacy
of minimum income schemes. Future research is needed to investigate the research
questions that lies ahead of this study. First, a natural follow-up would be to pro-
vide within-country analyses of the trade-off between the two working hypotheses
analyzed here, in order to complement the current study. In particular, is it the
overall generosity and aggregate expenditure of the European welfare states that
can close the puzzle by explaining both the direction of causalities behind the re-
sults of this study? Further, can we assume that more generous welfare states pro-
vide both a higher level of out-of-benefits and a higher aggregate expenditure on
Table 12 Log-log model with AR (1) disturbance, fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAW SAW SAW SAW
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.0290 0.0571** 0.0250 0.0156
(0.0191) (0.0187) (0.0268) (0.0341)
Trade union density −0.412*** −0.290** −0.306**
(0.0602) (0.0975) (0.104)
Total employment −0.225* −0.213*
(0.0874) (0.0919)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0167
(0.0378)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 416 415 299 299
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 13 Log-log model with AR (1) disturbance, fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MIPW MIPW MIPW MIPW
ALMP (% of GDP) 0.0388* 0.0553** 0.0371 0.0287
(0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0219) (0.0284)
Trade union density −0.263*** −0.198** −0.210**
(0.0455) (0.0751) (0.0791)
Total employment −0.119 −0.112
(0.0654) (0.0673)
Unemployment (% of LF) 0.0144
(0.0309)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 416 415 299 299
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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activation strategies? On the other hand, small welfare states would pin down less
generous minimum income schemes, whilst at the same time cutting on the ex-
penses related to reintegration of inactive individuals in the labor force.
Endnotes
1For instance, EU-SILC data on mean equivalized income before social transfers
by household type are available only from 2003 onwards (and for some countries
even later). Hence, dividing SA and MIP rates for the other two household types
available in the SAMIP dataset by the EU-SILC mean equivalized incomes would
allow only to investigate the period 2003–2013, which would imply a much smaller
sample.
2I will provide information or plots about both series whenever the measures of ad-
equacy differ substantially. Otherwise, the default adequacy measure is the one which
standardizes SA rates by GDP per capita. The full dataset and .do file producing results
for both measures of adequacy is available from the author upon request.
3Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test has been conducted for each of these four series be-
fore taking logs, in order to test for stationarity. None of these four tests indicated the
presence of unit roots for all panels.
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